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Abstract 
 
 This paper examines the role and value of conscience. Primarily, three basic conclusions 
are advanced: (1) that action in accord with conscience is productive of psychological health; (2) 
that for conscience to serve as an adequate guide to conduct it has to be developed; and (3) that 
both the expression and development of conscience require, or at least appreciably benefit from, 
the greatest amount of social liberty possible. In accord with the interdisciplinary nature of this 
project, the aforesaid conclusions were drawn (and are explored) from the diverse disciplinary 
perspectives of psychology, philosophy, religious studies, and history. Ultimately, more 
questions are raised than answered. Nevertheless, there is a central argument: conscience 
matters. 
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Introduction 
 
What is the role of conscience within a democratic society? What should it be? When I 
first began this project a little over a year ago, this is the question I was interested in engaging 
with. In particular, it was Leo Tolstoy’s pacifist writings that encouraged me to reflect upon the 
purpose of individual moral convictions within a democratic society, where, by definition, the 
majority rules. To be clear, conscience here refers to an individual’s intuitive sense of right and 
wrong. 
However, once I began to seriously look into the topic I quickly discovered it had been 
previously exhausted to the point that it was doubtful whether or not I could add anything to the 
discussion. Conscience was overwhelmingly considered of great importance. This is true of the 
writings of Leo Tolstoy, A.J. Muste, Henry David Thoreau, John Stuart Mill, Sri Aurobindo, 
Carl Jung, Carl Rogers, Viktor Frankl, Alice Chown, Gandhi, Marcus Aurelius, Seneca, Alan 
Watts, Aldous Huxley, etc., etc. Had I read more, I’m confident this trend would have persisted. 
Notably, the opinion that conscience plays an important role in life (democratic or otherwise) 
spans the disciplinary perspectives of philosophy, psychology, political theory, and religious 
studies, among others. Upon recognizing this, my focus shifted towards why conscience has been 
considered of value. This resulted in a far more exploratory work than argumentative. 
Consequently, it raises more questions than it answers. Nevertheless, I do make an argument: 
conscience matters.  
Ultimately, I arrived at three broad conclusions regarding the value and function of 
conscience. They are: (1) that action in accord with conscience is productive of psychological 
health; (2) that for conscience to serve as an adequate guide to conduct it has to be developed; 
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and (3) that both the expression and development of conscience require, or at least appreciably 
benefit from, the greatest amount of social liberty possible. Not particularly novel. Nonetheless 
important. I reached these conclusions via two main areas of inquiry: first, a theoretical analysis 
of several different systems of psychotherapy, the philosophic concept of liberty, and of pacifist 
theory; second, an exploration of the historical data regarding the experiences of Canadian 
pacifists during the First World War. 
Correspondingly, this paper proceeds in the following order: first, a discussion on the 
relevant insights of the various psychotherapies I studied (client-centered therapy, analytical 
psychology, and logotherapy); second, an overview of liberty and its relationship to conscience, 
particularly in terms of development and well-being; third, a brief summary of pacifism, what it 
is and what it entails; fourth, an outline of the experiences of Canadian pacifists during the First 
World War. 
 
I. The Real and The Ideal 
What is and what can be; reality and ideals. Too often the reality and the ideal are so 
dissimilar that to transform the one into the other seems without any real hope. One example of 
this being the reality of war and the ideal of peace. Sadly, it seems that the ideal is not much 
more than a dream. Unsurprisingly, apathy follows. Yet, at the same time, transforming what is 
into what could (and should) be is an essential characteristic of being human –  
being human means being in the face of meaning to fulfill and values to realize. It means 
living in the polar field of tension established between reality and ideals to materialize. 
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Man [sic] lives by ideals and values. Human existence is not authentic unless it is lived in 
terms of self-transcendence. (Frankl, 1969/2014, p. 34)1  
There is therefore no reason to conclude that the pursuit of ideals is a futile or hopeless 
endeavour. Rather, it is in this pursuit that we find some semblance of direction in life. Still 
though, it may be said, what of the impossibility of it all? – ideals are ideals, they don’t exist. 
Why pursue something that doesn’t exist? More pertinently, why pursue something that cannot 
exist? Clearly, if one does not pursue one’s own ideals, then it is guaranteed they will never be 
realized. And, if everyone were to take this approach, nothing would ever change, or, at least, 
things would change only in response to circumstance and chance. But things do change. And 
they change partly in response to human efforts. So, “though the ideal may not be immediately 
practicable, it is that to which our action ought more and more to move.” (Aurobindo, 
1950/1999, p. 157) It is only through pursuit that ideals can become reality – and it is only 
through pursuit that the ideals which today seem impossible of realization may in the future 
become reality. 
Furthermore, it appears that this behaviour is both natural and healthy, perhaps necessary, 
for human beings to engage in. Viktor Frankl (Holocaust survivor, neurologist, and founder of 
logotherapy) even proposes that the pursuit of ideals, in contrast to the pursuit of pleasure, is the 
primary motivator underlying human behaviour:  
                                                
1 Also consider: “Both what is and what may be are expressions of the same constant facts of 
existence and forces or powers of our Nature from which we cannot and are not meant to escape, 
since all life is Nature fulfilling itself and not Nature destroying or denying itself…Standing thus 
between the actual and the possible [is human] intellect.” (Aurobindo, 1950/1999, p. 149); “Our 
mentality represents the conscious part of the movement of Nature.” (Aurobindo, 1950/1999, p. 
150) 
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[n]ormally pleasure is never the goal of human strivings but rather is, and must remain, 
an effect, more specifically, the side effect of attaining a goal. Attaining the goal 
constitutes a reason for being happy [and] if there is a reason for happiness, happiness 
ensues automatically and spontaneously, as it were. (Frankl, 1969/2014, p. 19) 
In logotherapeutic terms the will to meaning, which is defined as “the basic striving… to find 
and fulfill meaning and purpose” (Frankl, 1969/2014, p. 21). What I hope to show in the 
following section is that the pursuit of ideals, in particular the pursuit of the ideal self, is 
productive of psychological health, and that action in accordance with one’s own conscience is 
an effective means of pursuing and achieving this end. 
 
Self and Ideal Self 
The central psychological construct forwarded by Carl Rogers2 is the self-concept, which 
can be further divided into the self and ideal self. Simply, self refers to who we are, as we are, at 
any given moment. It is the person one is in reality, what they think, say, and do. But, the self is 
not all of what we are. It only consists of the experiences an individual allows in, passed through 
a kind of conceptual filter (the self-conceptual filter), and the behaviours and thoughts that 
follow. Conversely, the ideal self represents a person’s idealized notion of themselves. It is the 
version of self someone thinks they should or could be. Importantly, Rogers’ concept of the ideal 
self is not a punitive collection of internalized rules and norms (this appears to be more 
characteristic of the self), but the person one truly is. In contrast to the self, the ideal self 
encompasses the totality of an individual’s experience. Moreover, it is thought that the ideal self 
                                                
2 one of the early forerunners of humanistic psychology and the founder of client-centered 
therapy 
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is something which individuals continually strive towards realizing, either consciously or 
unconsciously, and is thus one of the primary motivators underlying behaviour (similar to 
Frankl’s will to meaning). Within a client-centered perspective, neurosis occurs when the self 
comes into conflict with the ideal self. But (1) what is the ideal self? And (2) how does it become 
actualized? 
In response to (1), the ideal self is first and foremost a person’s entire physical being: “the 
inner core of man’s [sic] personality is the organism itself” (Rogers, 1953/1995a, p. 92). It is also 
the version of self that accords with an individual’s beliefs, ideals, and values. Still more, it is the 
representation of self that one truly is, i.e. the self that would be if a person were to fully 
experience and accept themselves. Appreciably, research into these concepts has found that the 
ideal self is a much more stable psychic construct than the self. (Rogers, 1961/1995b, p. 236) 
Accordingly, it has been observed that as individuals progress in therapy they tend to move in 
the direction of their ideal self rather than away from it – this means that instead of altering their 
values people tend to alter their behaviours, i.e. themselves:  
it had been our expectation that some clients would achieve greater congruence of self 
and ideal primarily through alteration of their values, others through the alteration of self. 
Our evidence thus far indicates that this is incorrect, and that with only occasional 
exceptions, it appears to be the… self which exhibits the greater change. (Rogers, 
1961/1995b, p. 236)  
It is worth mentioning that within a client-centered theory of persons (in contrast to, say, 
a psychoanalytic model) the self that ‘one truly is’ is thought of as something essentially 
positive: “[o]ne of the most revolutionary concepts to grow out of our clinical experience is 
the…recognition that the innermost core of man’s [sic] 
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personality…is positive in nature – is basically socialized, forward-moving, rational and 
realistic.” (Rogers, 1953/1995a, p. 91)3 A positive view of human nature represents a significant 
change in the field of psychology, and is one of the hallmarks of humanistic psychology. 
Because client-centered therapy holds this view of human nature, counselling focuses on 
bringing the inner self forward rather than subduing it. 
Which brings us to (2). Within a client-centered perspective the first step towards 
realizing the ideal self is that an individual fully allows into awareness and accepts all aspects of 
their experience in an undistorted, non-judgemental, and genuine manner (e.g. feeling sad when 
one is sad rather than angry and vice versa). In part, this involves experiencing aspects of oneself 
which are unpleasant and/or socially unacceptable, e.g. fear, anger, hate, greed, etc. By doing so 
we experience ourselves as we actually are and movement towards the ideal self becomes 
possible. It is thought that this is brought about primarily through the relationship established in 
therapy, which is characterized by non-judgment, empathic understanding, and unconditional 
positive regard. Interestingly, Rogers hypothesized that when a client-therapist relationship (or 
any relationship for that matter) was established that meets these conditions, growth would 
occur, more or less, of its own accord. The basic idea being that a relationship built upon the 
principles of non-judgement, empathic understanding, and unconditional positive regard create a 
secure environment (i.e. a healthy relationship) in which it is possible for individual’s to fully 
examine their own experience: “in the absence of any actual or implied threat to self, the client 
                                                
3 More on human nature: “There is no beast in man [sic]. There is only man in man, and this we 
have been able to release.” (Rogers, 1953/1995a, p.105); “As I descend into myself, I discover 
something exciting, a core that is totally without hate.” (Rogers, 1953/1995a, p. 99); “one 
client’s discovery [was] that the deeper she dug within herself, the less she had to fear; that 
instead of finding something terribly wrong within herself, she gradually uncovered a core of self 
which wanted neither to reward or punish others, a self without hate, a self which was deeply 
socialized.” (Rogers, 1953/1995a, p. 103) 
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can… examine various aspects of…experience as they actually feel… without distorting them to 
fit the existing concept of self.” (Rogers, 1953/1995a, p. 76) Moreover, during this process 
individuals develop an increasingly positive view of both themselves and of others, which in turn 
results in improved social behaviour. (Rogers, 1953/1995a, p. 87)  
An important implication of this is that when the ideal self is realized, or when the inner 
self is brought forward, people become increasingly socialized, tolerant and accepting of others, 
etc. Consider Roger’s (1953/1995a) description of a realized person: 
[w]hen man’s [sic] unique capacity of awareness is thus functioning freely and fully, we 
find that we have, not an animal whom we must fear… but an organism able to achieve, 
through the remarkable integrative capacity of its central nervous system, a balanced, 
realistic, self-enhancing, other-enhancing behaviour… when man is less than fully man – 
when he denies to awareness various aspects of his experience – then indeed we have all 
too often reason to fear him and his behaviour (p. 105). 
If Roger’s ideas concerning human nature have any basis in reality, then it is clearly 
desirable that the greatest number of individuals possible realize their ideal selves in life. 
Admitting this has certain implications for how we structure our social environments and for 
how we live. And in what way does this relate to conscience? Conscience can be of thought as an 
expression of one’s ideal self. Being so, conscience is worth listening to, as doing so may help 
lead one towards realizing their ideal self in life. 
 
Incongruence and Congruence; Changes in Therapy 
Incongruence and congruence describe the relationship that exists between an 
individual’s self and ideal self. Along with self-concept, they are two of the foundational ideas 
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forwarded in client-centered therapy. The terms refer to different states of being that fall along a 
continuum (often depicted using a venn diagram) and are thought of as the major distinguishing 
markers between psychological dysfunction and health. Simply, greater incongruence equals 
greater dysfunction and vice versa. 
Incongruence occurs when an individual’s self and ideal self are in contradiction or 
conflict with one another, whereas congruence occurs when the two are for the most part 
consistent or in harmony. Accordingly, the goal of client-centered therapy is to help individuals 
move from a state of incongruence to a state of congruence, i.e. from dysfunction to health. 
(Rogers, 1953/1995a, p. 103) Alternatively, the movement from incongruence to congruence can 
be thought of as the realization of (or closer approximation of) one’s ideal self in life.  
Over several years of practice Rogers observed that during therapy clients tended to 
follow a general pattern on their journey towards greater and greater congruence. This led him to 
the conclusion that “[t]he process of psychotherapy… is a unique and dynamic experience, 
different for each individual, yet exhibiting a lawfulness and order which is astonishing in its 
generality.” (Rogers, 1953/1995a, p. 74) The pattern Rogers observed consists of two major 
phases or movements. The first is negative. It is a movement away from, or disassociating from, 
aspects of the self which a person no longer is, can be, or desires to be. The second is positive. It 
is a movement toward the self one freely chooses, usually characterized by flexibility, creativity, 
and autonomy. This second phase has been alternatively conceptualized as a movement toward 
the self one genuinely is. Taken together, these two movements constitute the process of 
achieving congruence.  
To go into a bit more detail, during the first phase of this process individuals exhibit “a 
tendency to move away, hesitantly and fearfully, from a self that… is not.” (Rogers, 1961/1995b, 
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p. 167) Rogers describes this movement away as generally involving an abandoning of facades, 
ought’s, cultural expectations, and the need to please others. The first phase then is a kind of un-
becoming. The entire second phase can be summed up as a movement toward being. It involves a 
movement toward “that self which one truly is.” (Rogers, 1961/1995b, p. 166) Rogers 
(1961/1995b) notes that during this phase of therapy clients achieve greater autonomy, fluidity of 
self 4, a desire to be all of oneself, acceptance of self, general acceptance of others, and a greater 
trust of self. (p. 170-175) So, first a movement away from what we are not, and then a movement 
towards what we are. This movement towards being, towards becoming ‘what one truly is’, is the 
achievement of the ideal self in life. Through this, one becomes congruent.  
Significantly, Rogers’ description of successful therapy and ‘becoming’ bears a marked 
resemblance to Jung’s, particularly the latter’s concept of transformation. In Modern Man in 
Search of a Soul Jung describes psychotherapy as a process consisting of four basic stages: 
confession, explanation, education, and transformation. Each of the four stages has its own 
particular function in terms of development. 
The first Jung relates principally to the religious tradition of the confessional5, as well as 
to Freud and early psychoanalytic practices. Its primary utilities being catharsis and putting one 
in touch with repressed elements of the unconscious (Jung, 1933, p. 31). The second stage Jung 
also associates with psychoanalysis, and has to do with interpretation and understanding of the 
unconscious or repressed material brought forward during the first stage. This is sometimes 
                                                
4 Notably, Jung (1933) had a similar goal in therapy: “My aim is to bring about a psychic state in 
which my patient begins to experiment with his own nature – a state of fluidity, change and 
growth, in which there is no longer anything eternally fixed and hopelessly petrified.” (p. 66) 
5 “The first beginnings of all analytical treatment are to be found in its prototype, the 
confessional… As soon as man was capable of conceiving the idea of sin… repressions arose.” 
(Jung, 1933, p. 31) 
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referred to as shadow work. The third stage Jung (1933) associates primarily with Adler and 
individual psychology, its purpose being to teach the client habits which improve social 
functioning:  
[b]ut then comes the period of education, which makes us realize that no confession and 
no amount of explaining will make the ill-formed tree grow straight, but that it must be 
trained with the gardener’s art upon the trellis before normal adaptation can be attained. 
(p. 46) 
Lastly, transformation. Jung considered this stage unique to analytical psychology6, its 
purpose being the self-education, self-development, and self-perfecting of both doctor and 
patient as individual persons. Notably, the process of transformation involves both the therapist 
and client – similar to Rogers, Jung thought it was the result of a particular kind of relationship. 
Transformation involves finding meaning in individual life, getting in touch with and on good 
terms with the unconscious or inner self, and, evidently, the transformation of living that follows. 
Further, the usefulness of this stage is not restricted to the sick, nor is it merely a restorative 
practice meant to bring individuals up to social par. Rather, it is a way of transcending 
normalization, finding purpose in individual life, and, ultimately, becoming ‘what one truly is’. 
Consider Jung (1933) on transformation: 
                                                
6 Not really. Unique in consideration to what other psychologists were doing at the time, but 
really only a rediscovery of older knowledge, e.g. yoga. “It is a fact that the beginnings of 
psychoanalysis were fundamentally nothing else than the scientific rediscovery of an ancient 
truth… which the Eastern yoga systems describe as meditation or contemplation.” (Jung, 1933, 
p. 35) 
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we are speaking not of people who have still to prove their social usefulness, but of those 
who can no longer find significance in their value to society, and who have come upon 
the deeper and more dangerous question of the meaning of their individual lives. (p. 68)7  
What Jung calls transformation describes a very similar process to what Rogers calls 
becoming, and these processes further bear a marked resemblance to a few of the ideas that will 
be touched upon shortly – namely, Mill’s ‘development of individuality’, Aurobindo’s ‘self-
finding’, and Tolstoy’s beliefs regarding the necessity of bringing one’s way of living into 
harmony with conscience and reason. Fundamentally, they all describe a movement toward, or a 
realization of, or an actualization of, the ideal self in life.8 And, by realizing this self, or by 
bringing our action into accord with it, we become congruent, i.e. psychologically healthy. 
Again, what does this have to do with conscience? Read on. 
 
Conscience 
Conscience has been conceptualized in so many different ways that the word itself, by 
virtue of its seemingly infinite meanings, has become next to meaningless. So, rather than 
discussing all the different ways conscience has been defined, we are here going to consider two: 
first, that conscience is solely a product of learning, i.e. the internalization of external social 
rules, norms, oughts, and shoulds; second, that conscience is an innate normative capacity 
                                                
7 This, I believe, is analogous to the second ‘movement’ of client-centered therapy, and what 
Rogers (1961/1995b) describes as becoming: “‘What is my goal in life?’ ‘What am I striving 
for?’ ‘What is my purpose?’ These are questions which every individual asks himself at one time 
or another, sometimes calmly… sometimes in agonizing uncertainty or despair… they are… 
questions which every individual must ask and answer for himself, in his own way.” (p. 164) 
Note the similarity between these questions and Tolstoy’s. 
8 Of course, Rogers, Jung, Mill, Aurobindo, and Tolstoy all had different ideas about what 
exactly the inner or ideal self is. Nevertheless, it does appear that all three considered its 
realization in life a positive thing. 
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possessed by human beings, essentially the inner expression of an individual’s ideals, – in client-
centered terms, an expression of the ideal self.  
The first definition of the word best relates to Freud’s concept of the superego. In this 
view, conscience is simply the internalization of social rules and norms, usually imparted unto 
individuals by their primary caregivers. Being a product of the superego, it is often punitive and 
a source of guilt. Accordingly, conscience is thought of as something to be reformed rather than 
listened to. This conception shares several notable similarities to a behaviourist perspective of 
mind, in which mental processes such as ‘conscience’ are largely, if not entirely, the product of 
conditioning processes.  
So, conscience is internalized rules, nothing more, nothing less. Not necessarily good, not 
necessarily bad (though, it could be bad if the ‘wrong’ rules are internalized). In this view, 
conscience, as distinct from rule following, is not allotted any special role in decision making, 
nor should it be. Noticeably, Frankl (1969/2014) took issue with this: “[r]educing conscience to 
the mere result of conditioning processes is but one instance of reductionism” (p. 6). 
The second definition shares some similarities with the first, but arrives at a different 
conclusion regarding the role of conscience in life. The similarity being that conscience is still a 
product of learning. However, rather than being conceptualized of as merely the internalization 
of social norms, it is instead thought to be the internalization and inner expression of ideals. In 
this view, conscience is a kind of innate normative capacity possessed by human beings, its 
purpose being to guide behaviour via feeling and by doing so alter life in a way that better 
conforms with an individual’s ideals – really, the ideals of the society they are a part of. This 
second definition more closely aligns with Frankl’s (1969/2014) thoughts regarding the purpose 
of conscience: “man [sic] is guided in his search for meaning by conscience [which] could be 
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defined as the intuitive capacity of man to find out the meaning of a situation.” (p. 43) 
Accordingly, the development of conscience, which would be the development and refining of 
one’s ideals, results in improved conduct.  
 So, conscience is the inner expression of ideals. By bringing our actions into accord with 
it, we move towards realizing said ideals in reality. If we suppose that ideals are worth realizing, 
conscience would then be something worth taking into consideration. In this view, conscience is 
something to be listened to. Again, this aligns with Frankl’s (1969/2014) views: “man [sic] must 
learn more than ever to listen to the ten thousand commandments arising from the ten thousand 
unique situations of which his life consists. And to these commandments, he is referred to, and 
must rely on, his conscience.” (p. 44-45) Why is it that life is so often unlike our ideals? Perhaps 
because we reduce, devalue, ignore, and consequently impede the development of a healthy 
conscience. The solution? To listen, to act, to observe the consequences of action, and to 
improve our behaviors accordingly. 
 
Implications 
If we recognize some process as healthy and desirable for individual persons in a clinical 
setting, it would seem reasonable that we would likewise admit that that same process is 
desirable for society at large, as society is really nothing more than a collection of individual 
persons. Accordingly, the insights, teachings, and practices of the different systems of 
psychotherapy should not be restricted to medical settings; rather, they can and should be applied 
in everyday life – “[a]ll the implements of psychotherapy developed in clinical practice, refined 
and systematized, are now put at our service and can be used for our self-education and self-
perfectioning.” (Jung, 1933, p. 53)  
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II. Liberty 
During the First World War Sri Aurobindo9 authored a little-known book titled The Ideal 
of Human Unity, in which he forwards a rather unique solution to world conflict: unity in 
diversity. Central to Aurobindo’s theory of achieving unity through diversity is the principle of 
liberty, – a principle which he considered “the most precious gain of humanity’s past spiritual, 
political, and social struggles.” (Aurobindo, 1950/1999, p. 136) Interestingly, Aurobindo 
(1950/1999) reasoned that liberty was one of the foundational truths of existence and therefore a 
social principle based, not on positive law, but on natural law:  
[n]ature does not manufacture, does not impose a pattern or rule from outside; she impels 
life to grow from within and to assert its own natural law… modified only by its 
commerce with the environment. All liberty, individual, national, religious, social, 
ethical, takes its ground upon this fundamental principle of our existence. (p. 155)  
He also considered liberty an indispensable component of any society deserving of the title ‘just’ 
and necessary for a durable peace to emerge among human beings. For, if a unity of the human 
species can be achieved through diversity, liberty needs be present, as liberty is a necessary 
precondition for diversity. 
However, what exactly a free society looks like or should look like is uncertain, and there 
are many instances when liberty has proved itself a greater threat to peace than productive of it. 
It is consequently appropriate to ask what is the ideal balance between individual liberty and 
                                                
9 Indian nationalist, political revolutionary, philosopher, and mystic. 
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state authority. Moreover, what role does conscience play in this equation? In the following 
section this difficulty will be addressed. 
 
Social Liberty 
Social liberty has been defined as “the nature and limits of the power which can be 
legitimately exercised by society over the individual.” (Mill, 1859/2006, p. 7) Alternatively, it 
can be thought of as the degree or number of freedoms allotted to citizens within a society. Yet 
the proper extent of social liberty is something persistently called into question, and it would 
seem that there is no clear solution to the problem.  
In On Liberty Mill argues in support of granting individual persons the greatest degree of 
social liberty possible. Yet, at the same time, he acknowledges the necessity of placing restraints 
or checks on liberty, observing that the liberty of one all too often results in harm to another. 
(Mill, 1859/2006, p. 11, 87) Again, we arrive at a dilemma – what is the ideal balance? In reply 
to this, Mill (1859/2006) proposes a standard colloquially referred to as the harm principle; it 
reads:  
that the sole end for which mankind [sic] are warranted, individually or collectively, for 
interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the 
only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized 
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical 
or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. (p. 16) 
Following this Mill proposes three basic conditions that must be met in order for a society 
to be considered free. They are: first, freedom of thought and conscience; second, freedom to 
pursue one’s own tastes and pursuits; third, freedom of association. (Mill, 1859/2006, p. 19) So 
 16 
long as harm to others is avoided, these conditions are to be met. By Mill’s standard, if they are 
not met, the society cannot be considered free. 
 In addition to the prevention of harm Mill maintained that there are several ‘positive acts’ 
which justifiably warrant the restriction of individual liberty and even compulsion on the part of 
governments. These include activities such as giving evidence in court, partaking in defense of 
one’s country, saving another’s life, etc. (Mill, 1859/2006, p. 17) However, and unlike the harm 
principle, Mill provides two instances when one’s duty to act positively towards others may be 
excused. The first is when the individual is likely to act in a more responsible manner when left 
alone. The second is when the attempt to hold the individual to the duty would cause greater 
harm than the good which would be produced by its fulfillment. (Mill, 1859/2006, p. 18) Taken 
together, these principles are meant to help us determine the proper extent of social liberty within 
a society.  
 
Liberty of Thought  
Liberty of thought is a notion central to Mill’s arguments in support of social liberty. The 
idea being that it is necessary both for better ways of thinking to develop and for incorrect ways 
of thinking to be found out and rejected. Grossly simplified, the value of liberty of thought is 
threefold: first, it allows for the development of a diversity of opinions; second, a diversity of 
opinions encourages discussion and argumentation; third, that through discussion and 
argumentation thought is refined. So, liberty of thought encourages dialectics, and through this 
process our ideas, beliefs, morals, etc., are cultivated and advanced. (Mill, 1859/2006, p. 24-29) 
Additionally, liberty of thought is desirable as it functions as a counterbalance to the 
problem of infallibility. Infallibility being the assumption that one’s opinions are always and 
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unquestionably true – in as in ‘not’, fallible as in ‘false’. Whenever an opinion is silenced, i.e. 
when liberty of thought is restricted, a claim of infallibility has been made on the part of those 
doing the silencing. Clearly, that an opinion or particular point of view is always and 
unquestionably true warrants discussion. And when liberty of thought has been restricted, it is 
unlikely that a discussion will take place. How could it? “Wrong opinions and practices 
gradually yield to fact and argument: but facts and arguments, to produce any effect on the mind, 
must be brought before it.” (Mill, 1859/2006, p. 27) Of course, there is not much use in having 
liberty of thought without also having freedom of speech: “[f]reedom of thought and speech – 
the two necessarily go together, since there can be no real freedom of thought where a padlock is 
put upon freedom of speech” (Aurobindo, 1950/1999, p. 240). 
Closely related to the problem of infallibility is the problem of ‘Truth’. Simply, when an 
opinion is put down without being properly considered, there exists the possibility that a true (or 
truer) opinion has been rejected.10 For obvious reasons, this is not desirable. And, even if the 
rejected opinion were false, in silencing it we would lose out on the opportunity to use that 
opinion as a means of refining our own position.11 Therefore, alternative and even contradictory 
opinions, correct or incorrect, should be permitted to co-exist as in either case they allow for the 
development of better thinking to emerge. Remember that a diversity of opinions is needed for 
meaningful discussion to take place. And that it is through meaningful discussion that thought is 
advanced.  
 
                                                
10 “History teems with instances of truth put down by persecution.” (Mill, 1859/2006, p. 35) 
11 “We can never be sure that the opinion we are endeavouring to stifle is a false opinion; and if 
we were sure, stifling it would be an evil still.” (Mill, 1859/2006, p. 24); “He [sic] who knows 
only his own side of the case knows little of that.” (Mill, 1859/2006, p. 44) 
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Liberty, Development, and Well-Being 
Perhaps the strongest argument in support of liberty is that it is necessary for individual 
persons, upon reaching the age of majority, to properly develop themselves and consequently 
attain a sense of both physical and mental well-being (of course, this assumes that development 
of individuality has something to do with well-being). The ‘development argument for liberty’ in 
particular spans disciplinary perspectives and can be found throughout the subjects of 
philosophy, psychology, religious studies, and political theory. This argument is especially 
prominent in the works of Mill and Aurobindo – for example, “the free development of 
individuality is one of the leading essentials of well-being” (Mill, 1859/2006, p. 65).  
Mill’s claim that the development of individuality is one of the central elements of well-
being hinges on two main points: first, that the development of individuality is necessary for and 
productive of social well-being as it allows for better ways of living to come into practice (Mill, 
1859/2006, p. 65); second, that it allows individual persons to reach their fullest state of 
development and by doing so happiness (Mill, 1859/2006, p. 72). Importantly, the development 
of individuality requires that persons have the freedom both to make choices for themselves and 
to live out those decisions. By making choices we develop our thinking, conscience, emotional 
patterns, etc. Mill (1859/2006) holds that the development of these faculties results in greater 
well-being, both in terms of the individual in whom they develop, and, consequently, for those 
who said individual comes into contact with: 
to conform to custom, merely as custom, does not educate or develop in him any of the 
qualities which are the distinctive endowment of a human being. The human faculties of 
perception, judgement, discriminative feeling, mental activity, and even moral preference, 
are exercised only in making a choice… The mental and moral, like the muscular powers, 
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are improved only by being used… In proportion to the development of his individuality, 
each person becomes more valuable to himself, and is therefore capable of being more 
valuable to others. There is greater fullness of life about his own existence, and when 
there is more life in the units there is more in the mass which is composed of them.” (p. 
67-72) 
If development results from choice, and we recognize that choice requires the freedom to make a 
choice, we can conclude that development requires liberty.  
Interestingly, both these points are mirrored by Aurobindo (1950/1999) when he writes:  
[s]o long as humanity is not full-grown, so long as it needs to grow and is capable of a 
greater perfectibility, there can be no static good of all; nor can there be any progressive 
good of all independent of the growth of the individuals composing the all (p. 32)12  
and, “[f]or man [sic] alone of terrestrial creatures to live rightly involves the necessity of 
knowing rightly…[both] for his own greater perfection and happiness… and the greater 
perfection and happiness of his fellow-creatures.” (p. 147) To clarify, ‘knowing rightly’ is the 
result of learning, which requires choice, which requires liberty. 
A further alleged benefit of the development of individuality is that it creates better, more 
moral persons, who in turn create a better world. The basic idea being that as individuals develop 
they become more useful to both themselves and to others. Appreciably, this is Aurobindo’s 
                                                
12 More from Aurobindo (1950/1999): “without individual growth there can be no real and 
permanent good of all” (p. 32); “[a]lways it is the individual who progresses and compels the rest 
to progress; the instinct of the collectivity is to stand still in its established order.” (p. 32); 
“without the freedom of the individual a society cannot remain progressive [as the] free 
individual is the conscious progressive: it is only when he is able to impart his own creative and 
mobile consciousness to the mass that a progressive society becomes possible.” (p. 242) 
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(1950/1999) principal argument in The Ideal of Human Unity, and what he bases the possibility 
of unity in diversity upon:  
[t]he sound order is that which comes from within as the result of a nature that has 
discovered itself and found its own law and the law of its relations with others. Therefore 
the truest order is that which is founded upon the greatest possible liberty; for liberty is at 
once the condition of vigorous variation and the condition of self-finding. (p. 243)  
Aurobindo’s ‘self-finding’ is synonymous with Mill’s ‘development of individuality’. To restate, 
the basic argument is that individual development produces more moral persons, who in turn 
create better societies, which in turn produces better persons, and so on. Liberty is desirable as it 
allows for the development of individuality – it allows for the development of conscience.  
 
III. Pacifism 
Pacifism as a moral doctrine or normative ethical theory expresses the ideas and practices 
of several different religious, political, and philosophical traditions. That being so, there is in 
reality no one all-encompassing pacifism; rather, there are pacifisms. It is consequently doubtful 
that the term can be defined in a way that would completely satisfy or properly represent all of its 
various adherents and meanings. And so, a definition of that kind will not be provided here. 
Instead, a description of pacifism that aims at capturing the general spirit of the practice and the 
common threads that run throughout the different positions will be offered.  
That being said, pacifism can be separated into two distinct basic groupings: sectarian 
and non-sectarian. While this difference may not be of particular importance to an understanding 
of the idea generally, it is of considerable practical importance as it has made a noticeable 
difference in the actual application of pacifist principles to life. More importantly, the distinction 
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between sectarian and non-sectarian pacifism is meaningful in the context of Canadian pacifism 
during the First World War. Accordingly, the principal differences between the two positions 
will be made clear. 
Finally, several aspects of Tolstoyan pacifist theory will be examined as they played an 
important role in the development of a new kind of socially oriented pacifism, one which helped 
bridge the ideological divide between sectarian and non-sectarian pacifists:  
Tolstoy… was instrumental in the formulation of a new pacifist idea built upon individual 
moral responsibility with a universal application to all mankind rather than just a 
sectarian Christian approach – a pacifism concerned with the extent to which war and 
violence are rooted in the social environment. (Socknat, 1987, p. 18) 
 
What is Pacifism? 
Etymologically, pacifism is derived from the Latin word “pacific,” which means “peace 
making” (paci, from pax, meaning “peace”, and ficus meaning “making”). Today, in the broadest 
sense of the word, pacifism can be defined as the rejection of violence, force, or excessive 
coercion as an appropriate means of settling disputes, effecting social change, remediating 
injustice, etc. (Huxley, 1937/1986, p. 64-68)13 Accordingly, most pacifists deny the validity of 
war, which is what the word has come to be commonly understood as indicating – a rejection of 
war. This is true, but only partially. Pacifism encompasses significantly more than just a 
rejection of war. At most, it is a comprehensive philosophy of living directed towards the 
                                                
13 Though Huxley has been cited, this definition is not based upon any particular text or author. 
Rather, it is what I have come to understand pacifism as meaning. 
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realization of peace.14 And when understood in its full significance, pacifism applies to all of life, 
not merely a single and isolated feature such as war. Likewise, it applies equally during times of 
peace as during times of conflict. In fact, the practice is arguably more applicable during peace 
time than war time as it is then that conditions may be so altered as to prevent future conflicts. 
Ultimately, pacifism is a way of living that seeks to establish peace via peaceful means, both 
between individual persons, communities, nations, and, at most, all living things (so far as this is 
possible). But how exactly does one arrive at this point of view? 
Pacifism is the result of accepting a set of principles which generally include or are 
founded upon the recognition of life as sacred – “[t]he recognition of the life of every man [sic] 
as sacred is the first and only basis of all ethics… Life is a value which has no weight nor size… 
and so there is no sense in destroying a life for a life.” (Tolstoy, 1894/2016c, p. 186)15 For some 
pacifists this means all life and for others it means only human life. To be clear, sacred in this 
context means that life is recognized as being of the utmost value, therefore to be preserved, 
respected, and cultivated always. In line with this way of thinking the unnecessary destruction of 
life is considered a senseless and depraved action, anathema to the pacifist spirit, something to be 
avoided to the greatest extent possible. How an individual or group arrives at this recognition 
varies considerably; it can and has been founded on religious, humanistic, and philosophic 
grounds. Nevertheless, it does appear that the sacredness of life is a notion that commonly 
                                                
14 In Letters from a Stoic Seneca describes peace as central to all philosophy: “You want to 
know, do you, what philosophy has unearthed, what philosophy has achieved?... She does not set 
about constructing walls or arms or anything of use in war. On the contrary, her voice is for 
peace, calling all mankind to live in harmony.” (Seneca, 1969/2004, p. 171)  
15 This concept is sometimes extended to include all life, e.g. the virtue of Ahimsa, present in 
Jainist, Buddhist, and Hindu traditions: “absence of even the desire to do harm to any living 
being… complete non-violence to the extent that is humanly possible” (Long, 2009/2015, p. 
193); “Never producing pain by thought, word, and deed, in any living being, is what is called 
Ahimsa, non-injury. There is no virtue higher than non-injury.” (Vivekananda, 1896/2017, p. 44)  
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underlies and unites the different expressions of pacifism – both in terms of religious and non-
religious pacifists (of course, what exactly sacred means varies). 
Pacifist theory generally denies that any real and enduring good can be brought into the 
world through violent, oppressive, or hate-inspired means. It therefore denies the validity of war 
and conquest, whether political, religious, military, or economic in its motivation; of armed 
resistance and revolution (despite often lofty sentiments); and even, in its more uncompromising 
expressions, of police forces, of courts of law, of government, - that is, of any organization or 
way of being that is maintained by or profits from the injury, exploitation, corruption, 
oppression, or outright annihilation of human life.16  
However, as mentioned earlier, pacifism has different meanings depending on who it is 
being defined by. It is useful, therefore, to think of pacifism as existing on a spectrum – on the 
one hand there are pacifists who always and absolutely reject the legitimacy of war, on the other 
there are those who maintain that there are certain circumstances under which war is justified, 
e.g. in order to stop the Nazi’s. What unites these different groups is an underlying commitment 
to peace. 
Instead of violence, pacifists support the use of non-violence as a means of achieving 
social reform. Ideally, this approach is characterized by love, forgiveness, respect for those who 
disagree, humility, and self-suffering when necessary. Some examples of non-violent methods 
include education, arbitration, various kinds of economic manoeuvres (boycotts and strikes), 
                                                
16 This is somewhat of an over-generalization. War and the taking of life have been permitted by 
some under certain circumstances, though this appears to be an exception among pacifists rather 
than a rule. Absolutist and anarchistic views, which go so far as to deny the validity of law, 
police, and government, are more often held by sectarian than non-sectarian pacifists. Still 
though, “[the] annihilation of life cannot be a means of the amelioration of life; it is a suicidal 
act.” (Tolstoy, 1894/2016c, p. 186)  
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non-payment of taxes, and voluntary imprisonment. Considered outwardly, these methods have 
two principal goals: first, to arouse in others ‘pangs of conscience’, i.e. to awaken moral 
sentiment and by doing so alter public feeling and action in accord with pacifist ends; second, 
similar to the first, to generate discussion surrounding the issue of interest and consequently 
encourage individuals to question the legitimacy of their own and others actions. Inwardly, 
adherents are concerned about acting in harmony with their inner sense of right and wrong, 
whether it be recognized as God, conscience, love, or reason. 
What exactly pacifism means differs from group to group and within groups between 
individuals, as there is in every case different reasoning and belief underlying acceptance of the 
idea. Likewise different understandings of principles lead to different practices, which in turn 
produce different ends. Regardless, the different pacifisms and pacifists are united in their 
insistence upon and pursuit of peace.  
 
Sectarian Pacifism; Christianity and Non-Resistance 
 As it is being used here sectarian has two meanings. First, it designates a subgroup. For 
example, the Quakers, Mennonites, Hutterites, etc., are all subgroups (sects) of the larger 
category of Christianity. They are accordingly designated as sectarian. Secondly, the term is 
being used to differentiate between pacifists who found their way of living on sectarian religious 
principles, such as the abovementioned Quakers, Mennonites, and Hutterites, versus those who 
do not. Thomas Socknat (1987) provides a fitting description of the latter: “[t]he non-sectarian 
peace movement… was not pacifist in the strict sense, it was an example of the liberal, rational 
approach to international affairs – the belief that reason and arbitration could prevent war” (p. 
41).  
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 One of the better-known expressions of sectarian pacifism is the kind founded upon the 
teachings and example of Christ as documented in the Gospels of Matthew, Mark, Luke, and 
John. In particular, Christian pacifism relies upon the moral instructions espoused in Matthew 
five to seven, the Sermon on the Mount. More specifically still, Christian pacifists base their 
views upon Christ’s teaching of not resisting evil by force. The movements historic prominence 
has led some scholars to the conclusion that “pacifism is basically a Christian phenomenon” 
(Socknat, 1987, p. 3).  
Peaceful living on the part of Christians has been observed since the first century and it is 
generally agreed that early Christians were for the most part pacifists. (Socknat, 1987, p. 4; 
Huxley, 1937/1986, p. 17-20) However, the practice of peaceful non-resistance on the part of 
Christians has fallen and risen throughout history, seeing a notable fall in the fourth century 
when the religion was adopted by Constantine, and a notable rebirth during the fifteenth century 
in reaction to the various reformation movements:  
[t]he Church’s pacifist period terminated with the accession of Constantine and the 
appearance of the theory of the ‘just war’ as formulated by St. Ambrose and amplified by 
St. Augustine.” (Socknt, 1987, p. 4)  
Also consider Tolstoy’s (1894/2016c) recounting of 15th century reformer Petr Chelčický’s 
work:  
[Chelčický’s] fundamental idea is that Christianity, by allying itself with temporal power 
in the days of Constantine, and by continuing to develop in such conditions, has become 
completely distorted, and has ceased to be Christianity altogether… [Chelčický] teaches 
previously what… is taught in these days by the non-resistant Mennonites and Quakers… 
He teaches that Christianity, expecting from its adherents’ gentleness, meekness, 
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peaceableness, forgiveness of injuries, turning the other cheek when one is struck, and 
love for enemies, is inconsistent with the use of force, which is an indispensable 
condition of authority. (p. 13)  
Similar to the earlier reformation movements, the social gospel movement of the mid nineteenth 
century led to a general revival of pacifist sentiments among Christians (Tolstoy’s work 
contributed greatly to this). Still, the real preserver of Christian pacifism has always been and is 
likely to remain the more radical sects and thinkers within the tradition. 
 Christian expressions of pacifism are striking for several reasons, perhaps most of all for 
their apparent simplicity, both in respect to how the position is arrived at and how it is lived. In 
terms of how the position is arrived at, the line of reasoning goes something like this: first, one 
needs accept that there is a God, whatever that may mean; second, that Christ was either God in 
human form, a divinely inspired human being, or, at the very least, a teacher of divine truth; 
third, that Christ left an example for human beings to emulate, and that by doing so one lives 
according to divine law; fourth, the opinion that Christ taught, above all, forgiveness, humility, 
non-resistance to evil, turning the other cheek, doing good to one another, – in a word, peace. If 
one accepts these premises it would seem that the logical result would be pacifistic in nature. 
This is indeed the case for Christian pacifists. And although the different pacifist sects all hold 
subtlety different beliefs and interpret Christ’s teachings in different ways, the above more or 
less captures the basic position held in common among Christian pacifists. Consider the position 
of the Doukhobours: 
[l]ike that of the Quakers, the Doukhobours’ faith is based upon a radical belief in the 
presence of Christ’s spirit in each person… [and so] they naturally deny the right of the 
state or other external authority to dictate their actions. And, since all [people] are vessels 
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for the divine essence, they regard it as sinful to kill other men, even in war… The 
Doukhobour philosophy present in the twentieth century, however, did not appear until 
their old traditions were fused with Tolstoyan ideas in the late nineteenth century.” 
(Socknat, 1987, p. 16)  
Some of Tolstoy’s (1889/2014b) ideas:  
[w]hen we say, ‘Turn the other cheek,’ ‘Love your enemies,’ we express the very essence 
of Christianity… ‘Resist not evil’ means, never resist, never oppose violence; or, in other 
words, never do anything contrary to the law of love. If one takes advantage of this 
disposition and affronts you, bear the affront, and do not, above all, have recourse to 
violence. (p. 9) 
In terms of how it is lived, one of the more striking features of Christian pacifism is the 
tendency of adherents to take an absolutist stance on the impermissibility of violence. This has 
meant in the past that individuals would refuse to participate in violence to the point of 
imprisonment, torture, and, in some cases, death. In other words, people would refuse to act in 
opposition to principle and conscience regardless of ill-treatment. Actions of this sort properly 
exemplify the phenomenon of Christian martyrdom, which both Tolstoy and Mill considered 17 
One final characteristic unique among sectarian Christian pacifists is the trend of groups 
to isolate themselves from the larger society they are a part of, maintain a traditional mode of 
                                                
17 Tolstoy (1889/2014b) on martyrs: “If there has been in history a progressive movement for the 
suppression of evil, it is due to [those] who understood the doctrine of Jesus – who endured evil, 
and resisted not evil by violence. The advance of humanity towards righteousness is due, not to 
the tyrants, but to the martyrs.” (p. 31) Mill (1859/2006) in reference to martyrs: “The only case 
in which the higher ground has been taken on principle and maintained with consistency, by any 
but an individual here or there, is that of religious belief” (p. 13). 
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life, and organize themselves in communal social arrangements.18 In modern times this practice 
is best exemplified by peoples such as the Hutterites, Mennonites, and Doukhobors. 
Significantly, this mode of living has proven an effective means of preserving a pacifist point of 
view during times of conflict, – as will be touched upon later, the majority of Canadian pacifists 
who maintained their beliefs during the First World War were members of such communities, 
which seemed to provide them with a kind of mental resilience (or stubbornness, depending on 
your point of view) that was not typically found among non-sectarian pacifists. Moreover, 
members of such communities were less susceptible to ‘war hysteria’, i.e. the great social 
pressure which compelled individuals into service by means of guilt, insult, shaming, etc., and 
were consequently better able to maintain a pacifist position throughout the war. 
Of course, Christian pacifism, likewise pacifism and Christianity, cannot be reduced to a 
single set of behaviours, nor a single way of thinking, nor a uniform set of beliefs. It manifests 
itself in different ways in different peoples at different times. And so, to say that one way is the 
definitive way or that all pacifists act and think according to this way would not only be 
incorrect, but a great injustice to the diversity of practices and beliefs that exist. Nevertheless, 
there are similarities among the different Christian pacifists, and these similarities provide a 
starting point for understanding. 
 
Non-Sectarian Pacifism; The Religion of Humanity 
If it is relatively straightforward to understand how religiously inspired persons arrive at 
a pacifist point of view and way of life, it is comparatively difficult to understand how and for 
                                                
18 Not all Christian pacifists go this route. The Quakers, for example, have in general been very 
socially active, i.e. not separate from their larger societies. Overall, isolated communalism as a 
way of living appears to be on the decline. 
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what reasons the non-religious end up there. Canadian war historian Thomas Socknat (1987) has 
suggested that “non-sectarian [pacifists] were inspired by the enlightenment’s emphasis on 
rationalism and humanism” (p. 19). A similar observation was made by Sri Aurobindo 
(1950/1999) when he theorized that modern rationalistic and humanistic morality was the result 
of a growing acceptance of something he termed ‘the intellectual religion of humanity’19, a 
phenomenon attributed to eighteenth century enlightenment thinkers, essentially a modern 
substitute for the “formal spiritualism of ecclesiastical Christianity” (p. 294). It is described as 
follows:   
The fundamental idea is that mankind is the godhead to be worshipped and served by 
man and that the respect, the service, the progress of the human being and human life are 
the chief duty and chief aim of the human spirit… War, capital punishment, the taking of 
human life, cruelty of all kinds whether committed by the individual, the State or society, 
not only physical cruelty, but moral cruelty, the degradation of any human being… under 
whatever specious plea or in whatever interest, the oppression and exploitation of man by 
man, of class by class, of nation by nation and all those habits of life… which religion 
and ethics formerly tolerated or even favoured in practice… are crimes against the 
religion of humanity, abominable to its ethical mind… to be fought against always, in no 
degree to be tolerated. Man must be sacred to man regardless of all distinctions of race, 
creed, colour, nationality, status, political or social advancement… This, speaking 
largely, is the idea and spirit of the intellectual religion of humanity (Aurobindo, 
1950/1999, p. 295-296) 
                                                
19 Aurobindo (1999) on the religion of humanity: “Democracy, socialism, pacifism are to a great 
extent its by-products or at least owe much of their vigour to its inner presence.” (p. 295) 
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If Christian pacifism can be understood as the outcome of acceptance of a set of premises, 
likewise non-sectarian pacifism can be understood in this way. Accordingly, it seems reasonable 
to suggest that the acceptance of Aurobindo’s religion of humanity, or something very similar, 
provides the foundation for many of the non-sectarian forms of pacifism.  
One further distinction that can be made between sectarian and non-sectarian forms of 
pacifism is that non-sectarian approaches have traditionally been more socially oriented. In 
contrast to sectarian pacifists who have in general tended to take a separational and isolationist 
approach towards application of their ideals, non-sectarian pacifists have been interested in 
introducing social reform – transforming society through peace. Markedly, this fits with 
Aurobindo’s (1950/1999) expectations concerning the objects of the religion of humanity: “[t]he 
aim of the religion of humanity… was and still is to re-create human society in the image of 
three kindred ideas, liberty, equality and fraternity.” (p. 298) 
 
Tolstoy 
 Tolstoy is of course best known for his great literary achievements Anna Karenina and 
War and Peace. But the Russian novelist also wrote extensively on the subjects of Christianity, 
social reform, anarchism, and pacifism. And even though the author’s latter works are often 
overshadowed by his great novels, they are arguably Tolstoy’s superior contributions to thought 
and to humanity. In order to better understand Tolstoy’s pacifist views, it would first be helpful 
to touch upon the experiences that led him to think as he did. And this begins with a spiritual 
awakening. 
Tolstoy’s (1921/2005a) religious conversion occurred in his fiftieth year following a 
period of intense psychic distress: 
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My question – that which at the age of fifty brought me to the verge of suicide – was the 
simplest of questions, lying in the soul of every man from the foolish child to the wisest 
elder: it was a question without answering which one cannot live, as I had found by 
experience. It was: ‘What will come of what I am doing today or shall do tomorrow? – 
What will come of my whole life?’ (p. 21). 
 The result was at first the author’s wholesale adoption of Russian orthodox Christianity. But this 
was not to last. Tolstoy was unable to reconcile the great contradictions he perceived between the 
teachings of Christ and the those of the Church. Their apparent irreconcilability led him to re-
examine both his own convictions and the ‘Christianity’ he had been taught since birth: 
I was troubled most that the miseries of humanity, the habit of judging one another, of 
passing judgement upon nations and religions, and the wars and massacres which resulted 
in consequence, all went on with the approbation of the Church. The doctrine of Jesus… 
was extolled by the Church in words, but at the same time the Church approved what was 
incompatible with the doctrine.” (Tolstoy, 1889/2014b, p. 3); “I had been taught… I was 
taught… I was taught… I was taught… Then I was taught… From infancy to manhood I 
learned to venerate things that were in direct contradiction to the law of Jesus” (Tolstoy, 
1889/2014b, p. 10).  
Ultimately, this search led Tolstoy to a new understanding of what it meant to be a 
practicing Christian, – an understanding founded principally upon the belief that Christ’s 
teaching of non-resistance to evil is essential. In fact, he came to regard non-resistance to evil as 
the fundamental teaching of Christ:  
[t]he command, ‘Resist not evil,’ is the central point of Jesus’ doctrine; it is not a mere 
verbal affirmation; it is a rule whose practice is obligatory. It is verily the key to the 
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whole mystery… When we regard it as a command impossible of performance, the value 
of the entire doctrine is lost.” (Tolstoy, 1889/2014b, p. 11)  
Tolstoy’s new understanding of Christianity served as the inspiration for much of his later 
pacifist writings. 
From this new understanding followed Tolstoy’s convictions regarding the applicability 
of Christian principles to humanity's ills. He came to think of the Christian mode of life as a 
practical and effective means of establishing lasting peace between both individual persons and 
nations – which he considered the whole purpose of Christianity: “[t]he whole doctrine of Jesus 
has but one object, to establish peace – the kingdom of God – among men [sic].” (Tolstoy, 
1889/2014b, p. 69) Further, he reasoned that if Christianity were understood and practiced in its 
‘true’ sense the result would be nothing less than the complete restructuring of all existing social 
arrangements: “Christianity in its true sense puts an end to government.” (Tolstoy, 1894/2016c, 
p. 142)20 Thus, Tolstoyan anarchism.  
Tolstoy’s moral philosophy was one of individual ethics, stressing personal 
responsibility, development of character, and action in accord with principle. While he is often 
criticized as being excessively moralistic, his writing is not overly prescriptive. Rather, Tolstoy 
recognized that different people have different truths and different understandings of what is 
good and what is evil. Even though the author personally considered Christianity a superior 
mode of life, he recognized that it was not the only mode of life, and that it could not and should 
not be forced upon others: “Christianity is a new and higher conception of human life. A new 
conception of life cannot be imposed on men; it can only be freely assimilated.” (Tolstoy, 
                                                
20 “The time will come and is inevitably coming when all institutions based on force will 
disappear through their uselessness, stupidity, and even inconvenience becoming obvious to all.” 
(Tolstoy, 1894/2016c, p. 165) 
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1894/2016c, p. 112) It is for this reason that Tolstoy considered non-violence an ethical 
imperative, as it is the only possible way to peaceably account for conflicting definitions of good 
and evil. He explains the need for a non-violent approach in the following way: 
in what way are we to decide men’s disputes, when some men consider evil what others 
consider good, and vice versa? And to reply that that is evil which I think evil, in spite of 
the fact that my opponent thinks it good, is not a solution… There can only be two 
solutions: either to find a real unquestionable criterion of what is evil or not to resist evil 
by force… The second solution – not forcibly to resist what we consider evil until we 
have found a universal criterion – that is the solution given by Christ. (Tolstoy, 
1889/2014b, p. 28-29) 
Still, perhaps the most important feature of Tolstoy’s pacifist theory, certainly the part 
that had the greatest effect upon other pacifists, was the emphasis he placed on the necessity of 
actual change in life. The basic idea being that if a better world is to come, if any improvements 
are to be made, it will be solely the result of our own efforts, and nothing more: “to aid ourselves 
to a better life, we need expect nothing from heaven or from earth; we need only to cease from 
ways that result in our own loss.” (Tolstoy, 1889/2014b, p. 86) In other words, he stressed the 
necessity of actually living one’s ideals. (Note the similarity between this and Rogers’ ideas 
concerning the ideal self and congruence.) Moreover, this component of Tolstoy’s work is 
particularly important as it further encouraged non-sectarian pacifists in their pursuit of better 
social systems and because it inspired sectarian pacifists to question the legitimacy of their 
separationist modes of living. In this way, he helped bridge the ideological divide between 
sectarian and non-sectarian pacifists.  
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Finally, Tolstoy’s conviction in the necessity of actual change in life stems from his 
recognition of the great contradictions that exist between life and conscience. Simply, conscience 
and life can be reconciled in one of two ways: by a change in life or by a change in conscience. 
Tolstoy (1894/2016c) suggests we pursue the former: 
One need only compare the practice of life with the theory of it, to be dismayed at the 
glaring antagonism between our conditions of life and our conscience. Our whole life is 
in flat contradiction with all… we regard as necessary and right… we do the very 
opposite of all that our conscience and our common sense requires of us. (p. 70); [t]he 
antagonism between life and the conscience may be removed in two ways: by a change of 
life or by a change of conscience. And there would seem there can be no doubt as to these 
alternatives… And therefore it would seem inevitable for [Christians] to abandon the 
pagan forms of society which they condemn, and to reconstruct their social existence on 
the… principles they profess. (p. 81) 
 
IV. Pacifism in Canada 1900 – 1918 
Though pacifists have only ever represented a relatively small proportion of Canada’s 
overall population, and “like women and native peoples, were seen as largely irrelevant in the 
flow of history” (Socknat, 1987, p. 5), their impact on the development of rights, freedoms, and 
definitions of citizenship has not gone entirely unnoticed. In regards to The First World War, 
pacifist resistance to the use of force offered a major challenge to the implementation of 
universal conscription in the form of conscientious objection, - refusal of military service on 
grounds of conscience - which in turn instigated broader social discussion regarding “questions 
of voluntarism, and obligation in a democratic society.” (Shaw, 2009, p. 3) By refusing service 
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and choosing to go against the tide of public opinion pacifists inspired discussion concerning 
rights within Canada and consequently played an influential role in determining what it means to 
be a Canadian citizen.21 Likewise, pacifist activity in Canada during the First World War 
functioned as a kind of ‘thought catalyst’ for the general public, challenging not only the idea 
that Government has the right to exact military service from its citizens, but also the prevailing 
moral norms of the country.22 
The following section will clarify who the Canadian pacifists were during The First 
World War, what brought them to Canada, their relationship to the Canadian government and 
public during wartime, and finally what it was about their actions that warrants discussion today. 
 
Canadian Pacifists 
Pacifists in Canada during the early twentieth century consisted primarily of members of 
one of the country’s five historic peace churches, which includes the Mennonites, Hutterites, 
Quakers, Tunkers (also called the Brethren in Christ), and Doukhobors. These different groups of 
people immigrated into Canada throughout the mid eighteenth and late nineteenth centuries, with 
the Doukhobors being the last to arrive in 1899. Notably, “Tolstoy donated the royalties from his 
[final major] work, Resurrection, to [help resettle the Doukhobors in Canada]” (Socknat, 1987, 
p. 17).  
                                                
21 “It is important to remember that the experiences of conscientious objectors in the first world 
war took place before the ‘rights revolution’. Their assertion of their right not to serve in the 
military was part of that transformation in the discourse of citizenship.” (Shaw, 2009, p. 7); “As 
a prophetic minority, they were influential beyond their numbers.” (Socknat, 1987, p. 10)  
22  “The continuing experience of war and the questionable state of international order… gives 
significance… to the pacifist ideal and its role in the preservation of the moral basis of Canada’s 
cultural identity, which includes the right of dissent, the right to freedom of conscience, respect 
for the non-violent resolution of conflict, and a commitment to achieving racial and religious 
harmony, gender equality, and social and economic justice for all.” (Socknat, 1987, p. 5) 
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Sectarian pacifists came to Canada for two primary reasons: first, the prospect of 
inexpensive land and the opportunity that comes with it; second, government recognition and 
protection of their religious values and atypical ways of living. The second reason was 
particularly important as many of these groups faced oppression and persecution in their 
respective countries of origin: “[g]uarantees of freedom from military service were more 
important for these groups than the quality, quantity, and price of land.” (Shaw, 2009, p. 45)23 
And, as the Canadian Government was at the time eager to settle the west, that is, it was 
interested in ‘nation building’, it eagerly welcomed the different pacifist sects and their beliefs 
into the country.  
In fact, not only did the Government of Canada welcome these different peoples to the 
country, it legally recognized their pacifistic styles of living and granted them exemption from 
military service on condition of the payment of annual fines. This recognition was officially 
documented in the Militia Act of 1793. And though the act was amended several times leading 
up to the First World War, upon the outset of war “[t]he non-conformist pacifist traditions of all 
[the historic peace churches] were protected by Canadian law.” (Socknat, 1987, p. 15) 
In addition to the historic peace churches, pacifist groups in Canada included the 
Jehovah’s Witnesses and Christadelphians, as well as several other smaller ‘radical’ 
congregations of the more traditional Churches, e.g. Baptists, Presbyterians, Roman Catholics, 
etc. And, of course, there were individual persons who rejected war independently of the larger 
                                                
23 “[T]he pacifist sects represented a radical revolutionary threat of unknown potential. Once the 
authorities reacted, large-scale persecution of Anabaptists occurred. Consequently, they began 
their search for a new home, a place where they could live according to their consciences – a 
search that ultimately brought them to Canada.” (Socknat, 1987, p. 12) 
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group they were a part of, though actions of this sort were the exception rather than the rule. 
Consider Socknat (1987):  
Jehovah’s Witnesses, Doukhobors, and the more traditional peace sects – Mennonites, 
Hutterites, and Quakers – formed the backbone of pacifist dissent in Canadian society and 
would provide the major resistance to compulsory military service in the course of the 
twentieth century... Outside the religious sects there was little pacifist activity in 
Canada’s early past (p. 19).  
Notably, pacifists who were not members of one of the five historic peace churches were not 
recognized and were therefore not protected under the Militia Act. 
 Altogether, it has been estimated that there were approximately twenty-six thousand 
(Shaw, 2009, p. 10) potential conscientious objectors in Canada during the First World War (an 
exceedingly small amount when considered in relation to the overall population, which was at 
the time around eight million), though this number is difficult to be certain of as “figures for 
conscientious objectors were not kept” (Shaw, 2009, p. 9). Besides, as most individuals who 
sought exemption did so on grounds other than conscience, it is almost impossible the know the 
exact number of pacifists in Canada during this time. 
 
World War One and a Shifting Public Opinion 
 World War One officially began in August 1914, conscription was established in August 
1917, the union government came to power in December 1917, and in April 1918 the Canadian 
government cancelled all exemptions from service except for conscientious exemption. A rude 
awakening for Canadians – not to mention the world at large. If this series of events was 
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shocking to the public generally, it was especially alarming to those who held pacifist beliefs and 
maintained a pacifistic way of living.  
 Perhaps the greatest difficulty facing pacifists during this period was that the broader 
public adopted a point of view contradictory and at times openly hostile to their beliefs and way 
of life. Curiously, as Canada at the time was predominantly Christian, and likewise Canadian 
pacifism was almost exclusively if not entirely founded upon Christian principles, that the public 
adopted a point of view wholly contradictory to that of the pacifists appears to be somewhat of a 
inconsistency. In reality, this fact serves as an excellent example of how a set of principles 
differently interpreted can result in a multitude of diverse and even conflicting beliefs. At any 
rate, leading up to and upon the outset of war there occurred a massive shift in public opinion 
within Canada. Though pacifism had previously been viewed as both “[r]espectable and 
uncontroversial” (Socknat, 1987, p. 43), in the presence of a rising militarism it came to be 
regarded with suspicion and disdain.  
 One of the primary sources of this shift in opinion was that the major churches all more 
or less adopted the position of the government towards war.24 In other words, they folded under 
pressure. Not only did the churches come to support the war in spirit, they actively encouraged 
young men to enlist, eventually recasting the war as some kind of apocalyptic crusade: “[t]he 
passionate call to arms… was transformed into an… eschatological confrontation between good 
and evil, between Christianity and the Antichrist epitomized by Germany.” (Socknat, 1987, p. 
                                                
24 “the nation’s churches… [were anxious] to prove themselves [and] gradually identified almost 
totally with national policy. As a result, the religious press championed the war as a righteous 
cause.” (Socknat, 1987, p. 49); “[The pacifist point of view was] silenced by the rising tide of 
militant Christian patriotism.” (Socknat, 1987, p. 48) 
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50)25 Consequently, military service was considered the fulfillment of a divine responsibility. 
And, as a result of mainstream Christianity adopting this position, pacifism appeared to most as 
something absurd, and, worse yet, a moral vice. Thus the vast majority of Canadians were 
unsympathetic toward the difficult decisions faced by pacifists during the war, - country or 
conscience. Among other things, this shift in opinion resulted in disenfranchisement, hateful 
rhetoric, scapegoating, and misapplication of the law (Shaw, 2009, p. 46). 
 
Conscription, Exemption, and Conscience 
 Conscription is compulsory service. Basically, it is when the government decides for 
individual persons whether or not they will serve in war, and often in what capacity. Clearly, the 
introduction of conscription posed a major challenge to ideas of social liberty and individual 
rights within Canada.26 For some, it posed a major challenge to conscience. 
 Conscription was introduced in Canada for the first time on August 28 1917. It was 
enacted largely in response to the needs of war time Britain and to make up for the relatively 
                                                
25 Consider Mill (1859/2006) on the subject of Christianity: “By Christianity I hear mean what is 
accounted such by all churches and sects – the maxims and precepts contained in the new 
testament. These are considered sacred, and accepted as laws, by all professing Christians. Yet it 
is scarcely too much to say that not one Christian in a thousand guides or tests his individual 
conduct by reference to those laws. The standard to which he does refer it, is the custom of his 
nation, his class, or his religious profession.” (p. 48) 
26 Both Aurobindo (1950/1999) and Tolstoy (1894/2016c) considered compulsory service a 
negation of liberty, and even destructive of the benefits of society: “For a whole century mankind 
thirsts and battles after liberty and earns it with a bitter expense of toil, tears and blood; the 
century that enjoys without having fought for it turns away as from a puerile illusion and is ready 
to renounce the depreciated gain as the price of some new good.” (Aurobindo, p. 10); “Universal 
military service is only the internal inconsistency inherent in the social conception of life carried 
to its furthest limits” (Tolstoy, p. 99) “But with universal military service it comes to pass that 
men, after making every sacrifice to get rid of the cruelty of strife and the insecurity of existence, 
are called upon to face all the perils they had meant to avoid… universal military service 
destroys all the benefits of the social order” (Tolstoy, p. 105). 
 40 
small contribution Canada had made towards the war effort previously. Notably, conscription 
was not always binding, and there were opportunities for individuals to legally get out of service. 
These ‘opportunities’ are what is known as exemption.  
 One of the rarer kinds of exemption citizens could apply for was conscientious 
exemption. As alluded to earlier, it is exemption from military service on grounds of conscience. 
Conscientious exemption was the most difficult form of exemption to obtain and was granted 
almost exclusively to members of one of the five historic peace churches. And even if someone 
was a member of one of the recognized pacifist churches, they still had to present their case 
before a tribunal. Because of this, exemption on grounds of conscience depended largely on how 
sympathetic local tribunals were to the pacifist point of view – many were not. For example, it 
was not uncommon for tribunals to ask potential conscientious objectors what they would do if 
one of their family members were being assaulted, and “[i]n the discourse of Canadian tribunals, 
acceptance of any level of force under any circumstances was read as evidence of hypocrisy in 
claiming conscientious objection.” (Shaw, 2006, p. 39) Along with a hostile public, this is one of 
the primary reasons why the majority of pacifists sought exemption from service on grounds 
other than conscience. However, Canadian tribunals did hear many cases and granted a 
substantial number of exemptions: “[by] the war’s end, local tribunals had heard over 300,000 
appeals, granting exemption in 86,000 cases.” (Shaw, 2006, p. 41) Still, conscientious exemption 
was rarely applied for and rarely granted. 
  It is important to recognize that the Canadian public, especially English-speaking 
Canadians, mostly supported the introduction of conscription. Recognizing this, it is interesting 
that even though Canadians approved of conscription in speech, the vast majority of those 
conscripted sought exemption of one sort or another. Remarkably, of the more than 400,000 
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Canadians conscripted, “93.7 percent of those called asked to be excused from serving” (Shaw, 
2006, p. 41). This figure led historian Amy Shaw (2006) to the conclusion that “[a]lthough the 
majority of Canadians had supported conscription as a means of equalization of sacrifice, they 
had apparently supported it as appropriate for someone else.” (p. 41) In light of this statistic, it is 
also curious that pacifists received such a hard time for objecting to war – it appears that many 
other Canadians felt and acted similarly. The general disinclination to be drafted led the Borden 
government to cancel all exemptions – except for conscientious exemption, which was granted to 
very few. (Shaw, 2006, p. 41) Of course, many Canadians did voluntarily choose to serve in the 
war. And this includes members of the historic peace churches. However, like the election of the 
Union government, the freedom surrounding voluntarism is questionable: “The average young 
man was under almost irresistible pressure to enlist. In Canada as in Britain, women and children 
were encouraged to shame men into uniform. Not to be in uniform labelled one a slacker or 
shirker” (Socknat, 1987, p. 62).  
 
Outcomes 
 The First World War is a defining event in Canada’s past. Among other things, it brought 
the then disparate peoples of Canada together and helped forge a Canadian national identity. It 
also irreversibly altered Canada’s relationship with Britain and to the rest of the world. 
Moreover, it marked a change in the relationship between Canadian citizens and their 
government: “the First World War marked a turning point in the relationship between the citizen 
and the state.” (Shaw, 2006, p. 7) Pacifist activity during this time is notable principally because 
of its effects on discourses of citizenship.  
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 If absolutely nothing else, the experiences of Canadian pacifists during The First World 
War raises several disquieting questions. Most importantly (and what I happen to be interested 
in) is this: at what point does conscience stop mattering? When do individual persons resign their 
sovereignty and become instead passive instruments of government? Should they ever?27 Though 
these questions arise out of the past, they are nonetheless relevant to us today. Given the 
increasing power and centralization of governments, they may be even more relevant today. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 At the outset of this paper I forwarded an argument encompassing three basic ideas. They 
were: (1) that action in accord with conscience is productive of psychological health; (2) that for 
conscience to serve as an adequate guide to conduct it has to be developed; and (3) that both the 
expression and development of conscience require, or at least appreciably benefit from, the 
greatest amount of social liberty possible. 
The supposition that action in accord with conscience is productive of psychological 
health is in particular founded upon three of the themes examined in this paper. The first being 
Tolstoy’s observations regarding the contradiction between conscience and life, the miserable 
condition which results28, and the way out of said condition. Second are client-centered therapy’s 
                                                
27  “To remove freedom in order to get rid of disorder, strife and waste, to remove diversity in 
order to get rid of separatism and jarring complexities is the impulse of order and regimentation 
by which the arbitrary rigidity of the intellectual reason seeks to substitute its straight line for the 
difficult curves of the process of Nature. But freedom is as necessary to life as law and regime; 
diversity is as necessary as unity to our true completeness.” (Aurobindo, 1950/1999, p. 153); 
“The over-centralisation which is the condition of a working uniformity, is not the healthy 
method of life.” (Aurobindo, 1950/1999, p. 243) 
28 “But, however much they try to deceive themselves and others, they all know that what they 
are doing is opposed to all beliefs which they profess, and in the depth of their souls, when they 
are left alone with their conscience, they are ashamed and miserable at the recollection of it” 
(Tolstoy, 1894/2016c, p. 121). 
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models of self, ideal-self, incongruence, and congruence, in particular the process of achieving 
congruence. Third is Frankl’s understanding of the function and importance of conscience.  
The claim that for conscience to serve as an adequate guide to conduct it has to be 
developed is based primarily on Mill and Aurobindo’s thoughts regarding development and well-
being. Additionally, this idea is supported by Rogers’ and Jung’s recounting of the changes in 
personality that occur during successful therapy. Likewise, the conclusion that both the 
expression and development of conscience require, or at least appreciably benefit from, the 
greatest amount of social liberty possible is built upon the work of Mill, Aurobindo, Rogers, and 
Jung.  
As mentioned in the beginning of this paper, more questions are raised than answered. 
And so, in closing, I would like to leave off with a brief treatment of one of said questions: what 
would life look like if it were directed by conscience? In the first place, it would be diverse, for 
there are as many consciences as there are individual persons. Moreover, conscience is 
situationally dependent, its exact expression being a combination of a person’s ideals, past 
experiences, social position, and their immediate circumstances. Therefore, a life directed by 
conscience would be involve a great variety of behaviours and modes of living, – which is not so 
different from life now. However, and unlike our present reality, a life directed by conscience 
would likely be a closer approximation of social ideals. For if conscience is the inner expression 
of ideals, and if this inner expression came to serve as the primary guide of action, then, 
presumably, reality would come to greatly resemble our ideals, diverse as they may be. This is in 
fact the hope of both Tolstoy (1894/2016c) and Aurobindo (1950/1999), and the change of life 
they thought necessary for the realization of a better world –  
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All these material reforms may be realized, but the position of humanity will not be 
improved. But only let each man [sic], according to his powers, at once realize in his life 
the truth he knows, or at least cease to support the falsehoods he is supporting in the place 
of the truth, and at once, in this year 1893, we should see such reforms as we do not dare 
to hope for within a century – the emancipation of men [sic] and the reign of truth upon 
earth. (Tolstoy, p. 202); an inner change could alone give some chance of durability to the 
unification [of humanity]. That change would be the growth of the living idea or religion 
of humanity; for only so could there come the psychological modification of life and 
feeling and outlook which would accustom both individual and group to live in their 
common humanity first and most…Until man [sic] in his heart is ready, a profound 
change of the world conditions cannot come… A frame may [be made] but the soul will 
have still to grow into that mechanical body. (Aurobindo, p. 277-283) 
 
 
Limitations 
 
The biggest limitation of this research is that the current relevance of the psychotherapies 
examined (client-centered therapy, logotherapy, and analytical psychology) are uncertain, as the 
field of counselling psychology has taken a marked turn in recent years away from philosophic 
understandings of the psyche and towards biological ones. Other limitations include: non-
essentialists views of personhood, deontological arguments both in favour and against extending 
personal liberty, and feminist pacifist activity during the First World War. 
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Future Directions 
 There are several promising future areas of research arising from this document. They 
can be sorted into four broad categories: conscience, pacifism in Canada, liberty and 
psychological health. Examples of the kinds of questions include: can conscience be 
operationalized? Can conscience be understood in terms of specific brain areas and/or particular 
neurotransmitters? What is the relationship between conscience and psychological health? Is 
liberty, that is freedom of choice, productive of psychological health? In collectivist cultures is 
conscience considered important? Etc. 
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